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Abstract 
This article focuses on the transition of the international monetary system to a multipolar structure. The international 
monetary system continuously evolves, reflecting developments in the world economy. The main problem of the 
current international monetary system is its dependence on one key currency which still remains the US dollar. The 
authors of this study address the issue of a transition towards a multipolar system by examining currency 
concentration. The primary objective of this work is to establish whether or not the current international monetary 
system shows signs of transitioning towards multipolarity. To achieve this, the authors have used tools measuring the 
level of market concentration. The change of polarity of the international monetary system is analysed with 
concentration ratios and the Herfindahl-Hirshmann index. The theoretical part focuses on definitions of key terms 
essential for this study, such as international monetary system, currency polarity, global currency, and currency 
concentration. For the practical part, data were sourced from the databases of global institutions, namely the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunications (SWIFT) and the European Central Bank (ECB). This part focuses on a period of time between 
2001 and 2019, and the results indicate that the current international monetary system shows signs of transitioning 
towards a multipolar structure. The level of currency concentration of the key reserve currencies dropped slightly, 
although not enough to cause a qualitative change of the current international monetary system. This study may serve 
as a base for future research on this topic. 
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The weakening role of the US dollar in the international monetary system and the transition to a multipolar 
monetary structure have been the subject of many studies. For a long time, the international monetary system, 
with the US dollar as the global currency, constituted a unipolar structure. In the 1980s, this dominance was 
challenged by the Deutsche mark and the Japanese yen. Yet, not even they were able to succeed in replacing 
the dollar as the world’s reserve currency (Eichengreen, 2011; 2019a). After the global financial crisis of 2007-
2008, the sustainability of the US dollar dominance became a matter of great debate once again (Masson & 
Dailaimi, 2009; Zhou, 2009; Cohen, 2011; Obstfeld, 2011; Fahri et al., 2011). At the G20 meeting in Paris in 
2010, the reform of the international monetary system was proposed by the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy. 
(Bennhold, 2010) Due to the debt crisis in the Eurozone in the following years, this reform was postponed. 
In connection with the creation of a single European currency, the Deutsche mark was replaced by the euro in 
1999, while due to the strengthening position of the Chinese economy within the global economy, the Japanese 
yen was partly replaced by the Chinese Renminbi, especially in Asia (Subramanian & Kessler, 2013). Historically, 
the dollar has played a critical role in European region (Eichengreen 2019a). The use of dollar and euro is on the 
same level in European region today. For geographical distribution of dollar, euro and renminbi in European 
region see Liu et all. (2019). In 2020, with the world on the verge of another global recession, discussions on the 
future structure of the international monetary system have come to the fore once more (Carver & Pringle, 2020). 
The last two decades have brought an increase in the importance of newly industrialized states in the world 
economy (Lowe, 2016), a deepening of global economic imbalances in the balance of payments current accounts 
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(Ito & McCauley, 2019) and a worsened state of the US and Eurozone economies in the global economy 
(International Monetary Fund, 2020a). Changes concerning the world economy and systemically significant 
national (or regional) economies have an impact on the international monetary system and constitute the key 
determinants with regard to its quality and future development. At the same time, the limited role of Emerging 
Market Economy (EME) currencies is in sharp contrast with their growing significance in the global economy 
(Sedláček, 2018). 
Due to these reasons, many authors talk of a necessity for the international monetary system to shift towards 
multipolarity. Eichengreen (2019b) regards the current dominance of the US dollar in the international monetary 
system to be a historical anomaly. The transposition to multipolar monetary system should be realized in short or 
medium term as a consequence of increasing of economic position of Emerging markets, especially Chinese 
economy. However, this conclusion, the so-called Berkley view, is inconsistent with the Harvard view, the main 
representative of which is Gita Gopinath, chief economist of the International Monetary Fund. According to 
Harvard view is current monetary arrangement sustainable in short and medium term. This hypothesis is 
supported by empirical facts that mostly 60 per cent of identified global foreign exchange reserves take the form 
of dollars, that more than 60 per cent of the foreign currency liabilities and assets of banks are in dollars, and that 
the share of world trade invoiced in dollars far exceeds the share of the United States in global imports and 
exports (Gopinath, 2017; Eichengreen, 2019b). The transition towards a multipolar monetary structure is also the 
subject of this study, aiming to capture the current development within the international monetary system by 
measuring the so-called currency concentration. Changes in currency concentration may indicate a gradual 
transition to a multipolar monetary system. 
Literature Review 
There is no single definition for the term International Monetary System (IMS). Němeček (2000) describes it as a 
summary of mutual connections between currencies and monetary systems of individual states and regions. It is 
a collection of objectively existing links between the individual currencies and the whole, as well as between the 
whole and the individual currencies. Fahri et al. (2011) and Mateos et al. (2009) characterize the international 
monetary system as a group of rules, agreements and institutions, which in turn determine the currency and 
exchange rate policy, their international coordination, the exchange rates and the provision of international 
liquidity. A similar explanation is given by Serval and Tranié (2015) and the International Monetary Fund 
(International Monetary Fund, 2019b). 
Because of its connection to the actual development of the global economy and international economic relations, 
the international monetary system is an important sphere of economic theory research (Civín, 2018). To meet the 
requirements for the development of international economic relations, any historical form of the international 
monetary system must fulfil three basic conditions: 
• allow free international movement of goods, services, capital, and persons (convertibility), 
• ensure the stability of the real value of monetary liabilities and receivables arising from the international 
movement of goods, services, capital, and persons (stability), 
• guarantee international payment relations (liquidity) (Němeček, 2000). 
An international monetary system with a multipolar structure comprises of at least three autonomous centres of 
currency strength, where the currencies (legal tender) of these countries fulfil all the private as well as official 
monetary roles described in Table 1 (Cohen, 2016). 
The transition to a multipolar international monetary system has been the subject of a number of expert studies 
(Rogoff, 2001; Cohen, 2008; Chinn & Frankel, 2008; Mateos et al., 2009; Masson & Dailaimi, 2009; Dailami & 
Masson, 2011; Fahri et al., 2011; Cohen & Tabitha, 2013; Campanella, 2014; Sipko, 2016) and is described and 
examined in many professional monographs (Eckert, 2012; Rickards, 2014; Cohen, 2016; Eichengreen, 2011; 
2019a; Ocampo, 2017). 
Table 1. The Roles of International Money. 
Function of money 
(currencies) 
Medium of exchange Store of value Unit of account 
Levels of analysis    
Private 
Vehicle currency, Trade 
settlement, exchange 
trading 
Investment, Debt (incl. 
capital function) 
Trade invoicing 
Official Intervention currency Reserve currency Exchange rate anchor 
Source: Cohen (2016), modified by authors 
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Table 2. Future International Monetary Systems Architecture Proposals. 
Architecture Key currency Leaders 
Flexible exchange rates USD, EUR, CNY (previously JPY) USA, Eurozone, China (MP) 
SDR / Bancor standard SDR / Bancor USA, G-20, IMF (MP) 
Gold standard Gold & USD USA (UP) 
BRICS declaration Currency basket BRICS (MP) 
Source: Own processing of information found in Dailami and Masson (2011), Kotecha (2011), Mateos et al. (2009), Amanto 
and Fantacci (2014) and Rickards (2014) 
These studies provide an outline of a possible future concept of the international monetary system that is based 
on three key reserve currencies –the US dollar, the euro and the Chinese renminbi (Japanese yen before). This 
is the most likely scenario for the future organization of international monetary system (Margininean – Orastean, 
2020). The deep analysis why renminbi could be used such a one of global reserve currency is presented by 
Eichengreen and Kawai (2014). The transition to a multipolar structure is conditional on the partial weakening of 
the US dollar, the euro maintaining a stable international position, and a significant strengthening of the Chinese 
renminbi. Currently is going on discussion about the revision of SDRs currency basket that will come into force in 
the middle of the next year. Due to the latest encouraging development of the Chinese economy, there is an 
expectation that the renminbi will increase its share in the currency basket of the SDRs. See Table 2 for a list of 
other possible future concepts of the international monetary system (MP – Multipolar Monetary system, UP – 
Unipolar Monetary System). 
Historically, a qualitative change of the international monetary system was related to its natural “unrestrained” 
transformation, which reflected the economic and political fundaments in countries issuing the key currencies. 
However, due to the inertia factor and the network effect, the transformation of the international monetary system 
was slow (Chinn & Frankel, 2008; Eichengreen, 2019a). 
According to the studies mentioned, a multipolar monetary structure would help stabilize the world economy. An 
increase in the supply of reserve assets naturally solves the Triffin dilemma (Portes, 2012), the “inherent conflict 
in a national currency also serving as a global reserve currency, because domestic and international policy goals 
do not generally match” (Bordo & McCauley, 2017). A multipolar monetary system enlarges the fiscal capacity on 
which the supply of secure assets is based, thus eliminating the future risk of their shortage (Zhou, 2009). 
Monetary dominance is distributed more evenly among more key currencies and the countries issuing them. As a 
result, a multipolar international monetary system becomes more symmetric (Fahri et al., 2011). 
Similarly, Krejčí (2014) claims that the transition from a unipolar to a bipolar or multipolar international monetary 
structure constitutes a straightforward change of the system through a qualitative structure transformation. A 
precise definition of the term monetary polarity is therefore necessary. Monetary polarity constitutes a certain 
number of autonomous centres of currency strength. Currency strength combines two aspects – autonomy and 
influence. The highest level of autonomy and influence in the international monetary system is achieved by 
countries whose currencies are the most important from the systemic point of view. The distribution of currency 
strength can be measured with concentration indicators, thus allowing concentration to demonstrate the position 
of a specific currency on a certain scale (currency pyramid) (Cohen, 2016). The advantage of using concentration 
lies in a more precise differentiation of the individual currency strengths within the international monetary system 
as a whole. The general consensus is that the higher the concentration is in a particular economic system, the 
lower the level of competitiveness (Mansfield, 1993). The currency concentration in the international monetary 
system can be defined as the “market” share of internationalised currencies in private and official monetary 
operations within the international monetary system (in accordance with Table 1). Currency concentration can 
therefore be studied at the level of individual currencies, currency blocs as well as the international monetary 
system as a whole (Cohen & Tabitha, 2013; Cohen, 2016). 
Methods 
In this research article, we strive to verify the following scientific hypothesis:  Between 2001 and 2019, the 
currency concentration in the international monetary system showed a downward trend, yet the international 
monetary system did not show signs of multipolarity. For our purpose, we use methodology by Cohen and 
Tabitha (2013), with several new parameters and indicators added. The trend of transition towards a multipolar 
monetary structure may be verified quantitatively by a falling coefficient of the currency concentration and 
increased levels of currency competitiveness in the international monetary system.  
Currency concentration may be measured with two tools, namely the concentration ratios (N-subjects ratios) and 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). A more detailed description of this concept can be found in the original 
source: Hirschmann (1964). The N-subject ratios and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index are often used in 
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economics to examine the level of market competition. For practical application, see Zemplinerová (1999). A 
partial currency concentration can be expressed as a ratio of a particular currency on the total volume of 
transactions within a specific currency role (according to Table 1). 





CRX  concentration ratio x currencies, 
Si  % the share i-th currency within an individual function, 
x  the total number of systemically important currencies. 
 
Since the concentration ratios constitute a rough indicator, it is advisable to also use the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index, which considers the sum of the squares of the shares of all selected currencies in the international 
monetary system (Hirschman, 1964). This indicator provides a notion of the competitive structure of the key 
currencies in the current international monetary system. 






HHI  Herfindahl-Hirschman index, 
Si
2  % the share i-th currency within an individual function, 
n  the total number of systemically important currencies within an individual function. 
The measuring of currency concentration is based on private as well as official roles of world currencies. In an 
ideal case, statistics for all the roles of world currencies from Table 1 would have been included. This is, 
however, effectively impossible. Where the role of currency interventions is concerned, statistics are not 
available, or they are published with considerable delay (Cohen & Tabitha, 2013). Central banks and 
governments prefer that data on these operations be confidential and non-public. 
Relevant statistics are also unavailable for data concerning the role of currency as a unit of account and the 
means for monetary calculation. What is more, the settlement currency and the actual payment currency may be 
different (Lacina, 2007). When a particular currency serves as an “anchor currency,” then its level may be 
measured and expressed in numbers. Yet, even in this case, it proves to be a complicated process with several 
fundamental limitations. World reserve currencies function as anchors if other national or regional currencies are 
focused on them, in any exchange rate way (Němeček, 2000). Nevertheless, not every type of such currency 
focus is entirely evident. For comparison purposes, countries that anchor their legal currency to the US dollar and 
the euro are listed. Firstly, Dollarization and euroization (according to the International Monetary Fund: Exchange 
arrangements with no separate legal tender), secondly, Currency board arrangements and thirdly other 
conventional fixed peg arrangements. Other currency arrangements from the soft peg category are not included 
(International Monetary Fund, 2019a). This role of currency shall be dealt with separately in this study.  
Other roles of currency in the context of monetary concentration shall be examined as follows: The role of 
currency as a medium of exchange at a private level of use shall be analysed on the basis of time series, using 
data published by the Bank for International Settlements (Triennial survey of global foreign-exchange market 
activity). Data are taken from the statistics on global foreign exchange turnover and OTC (Over the counter) 
derivatives global turnover (Bank for International Settlements, 2020).  
In addition, there are the ratios of the individual currencies on international payments from the Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) database, available for 2010 to 2019. A similar 
approach has been taken when analysing the role of currency as an investment medium. Here, currency 
concentration is examined in two ways: as ratios of selected currencies on the international banking market 
(Banks' cross-border positions on residents of All countries) and as ratios of selected currencies on the 
international bond market (Debt securities statistics) (Bank for International Settlements, 2019; Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, 2020). 
Moreover, we will focus on the role of reserve currency at the official level (foreign exchange reserves).  Here, we 
draw on data published by the International Monetary Fund within the COFER database (Currency Composition 
of Official Foreign Exchange) (International Monetary Fund, 2020b). In order to analyse currency concentration, 
the following key currencies are of pivotal importance: US dollar, euro, Japanese yen, British pound, and Swiss 
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franc. The renminbi share of allocated foreign-exchange reserves is not available until 2016 when was renminbi 
included into Special Drawing Rights basket. Table 4 presents current concentrations share of renminbi for year 
2019. After the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, which resulted in the strengthening position of the 
Chinese economy within the global economy, the Chinese renminbi began increasingly appearing as another key 
currency. 
Results 
To start with, Table 3 illustrates the level of currency concentration of two key currencies (N=2), the US dollar 
(USD) and euro (EUR), and subsequently of five reserve currencies (N=5); the US dollar, euro, Japanese yen 
(JPY), British pound (GBP), and Swiss franc (CHF). The lower part of this table shows the average when taking 
into account the four main indicators of currency concentration (Foreign Exchange (FX) turnover, Banking (cross-
border) Claims, International (Debt) Securities, Foreign Exchange (FX) reserves), and also when considering six 
indicators in total (OTC derivatives and Global payments added).    
Table 3. Concentration Ratios results (in %). 
Currency use 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 
FX turnover (vehicle) (N=2) 64.0 62.7 61.3 62.0 60.2 59.5 60.3 
FX turnover (vehicle) (N=5) 85.5 84.4 80.8 81.1 80.2 79.1 77.6 
OTC derivatives (N=2) 78.0 79.0 71.0 73.0 77.0 75.0 74.0 
OTC derivatives (N=5) 93.0 94.0 90.0 90.0 89.0 88.0 85.0 
Banking claims (N=2) 78.5 82.1 79.3 81.3 79.0 79.3 78.4 
Banking claims (N=5) 96.1 95.4 94.4 93.5 90.5 89.7 88.7 
International securities (N=2) 72.0 76.7 78.6 78.6 80.6 84.1 84.6 
International securities (N=5) 89.7 92.8 93.8 94.1 94.1 95.0 95.4 
FX reserves (N=2) 90.7 90.2 90.0 88.0 85.5 84.5 82.0 
FX reserves (N=5) 98.7 98.1 98.2 95.7 93.6 93.0 92.0 
Global payments (N=2)    73.8 72.3 72.9 74.6 
Global payments (N=5)    86.6 85.5 85.2 85.4 
Average (4 functions, N=2) 76.3 77.9 77.3 77.4 76.3 76.9 76.3 
Average (4 functions, N=5) 92.5 92.7 91.8 91.1 89.6 89.2 88.4 
Average (6 functions, N=2)    76.1 75.8 75.9 75.6 
Average (6 functions, N=5)    90.2 88.8 88.3 87.3 
Source: own research and calculations, data from Bank for International Settlements (2019; 2020), International Monetary 
Fund (2020b) and Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (2020) 
When we look at data concerning the period between 2001 and 2019 (Tab. 3), it is immediately obvious that no 
multipolar monetary system was created during this period. The dominance of two key currencies, the US dollar 
and the euro, is clear. Although other reserve currencies, the Japanese yen, British pound or Swiss franc, 
continue to be used in the international monetary system, the chances of them becoming a global reserve 
currency are currently effectively non-existent. The ratio of these currencies on the market in any of the currency 
roles is not higher than 10 %. Such a low ratio cannot be considered a currency pole. 
The main challenger of the US dollar and the euro, the Chinese renminbi, does not yet hold a comparable ratio 
when considering all the observed indicators (see Tab. 4). This is primarily due to extensive foreign exchange 
restrictions and the “non-openness” of the capital account (Prasad, 2016; Coase & Wang, 2019). However, the 
gradually increasing importance of the Chinese renminbi is evident across all the concentration ratios except 
Bank Claims for which data are not available (Bank for International Settlements, 2019; 2020; International 
Monetary Fund 2020b; Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 2020). 
The dominance of the US dollar and the euro demonstrates the bipolar character of the current international 
monetary structure. Auboin (2012) mentions a duopolistic market character. From the microeconomic point of 
view, the global OTC currency market represents precisely this type of oligopoly, where there are two dominant 
currencies and a competitive fringe in the form of other reserve currencies. Mansfield (1993) defines the following 
types of arrangements that may be, among others, applied also to the international monetary system. In a 
structure called the “near-unipolar system,” the ratio of the leading currency ranges between 45 and 50 %, while 
2 SciPap 29(2) 
 
 
at the same time no other currency has a ratio higher than 25 %. When we assess all the categories measured 
individually, it may be said that in 2019, the international monetary structure most closely resembles the so-called 
“near-unipolar” system (Tab. 4.) 

















USD 44.2 50.0 45.9 46.6 61.6 42.5 48.5 
EUR 16.2 24.0 32.5 38.0 20.3 32.1 27.2 
CNY 2.2 1.0 n/a 0.1 2.0 2.2 1.5 
Source: own research and calculations 
The aggregate indicators of the currency concentration of the US dollar and the euro do not show any significant 
changes in their average (Tabs. 3 and 4). A different picture emerges when studying the currency concentration 
with regard to the selected five reserve currencies (see Tab. 3). In the period in question, their average 
concentrations indicate a downhill trend. According to the databases of the International Monetary Fund and the 
Bank for International Settlements, the concentration of the five most important world currencies in the 
international monetary system is decreasing in relation to the other currencies, in particular to the currencies of 
countries from the EME group.    
In 2019, a higher level of currency concentration was demonstrated only by currency ratios on the bond market. 
On the international foreign-exchange market (FX turnover), currency concentration decreased, primarily due to 
the lower ratio of the Japanese yen, British pound and Swiss franc. The statistics issued by the Bank for 
International Settlements (Bank for International Settlements, 2020) clearly show that the decrease of these 
ratios benefited neither the euro nor the dollar, but aided the lesser ranked currencies, such as the Australian or 
Canadian dollar and the Swedish krona.  
As already was mentioned above, the ratio of the Chinese renminbi keeps growing across most of the currency 
roles, although where the level of currency concentration is concerned, it remains a side currency. By contrast, 
the currency concentration on the bond market (see Tab. 5) shows an upward trend, particularly due to the more 
extensive use of the euro caused by the consolidation and development of the European financial market. Even 
we thought that it is growing the role of the Chinese economy in the global economy, the use renminbi for a fixed 
incomes securities e.g., for financing the sovereign debt, including the corporate debt it is still relatively on very 
low level in comparison with the USD and EUR (European Central Bank, 2019a; 2019b). 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index generally better reflects the functional inequalities in currency polarity. The input 
data to calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes were obtained from the same sources as the concentration 
ratios. See Table 5 for the resulting values. Until 2010, a fall in currency concentration can be seen, indicating a 
gradual transition towards a multipolar monetary system. 
Table 5. Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices Results. 
HHI index for IMS 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 
FX turnover (vehicle) 0.279 0.272 0.269 0.268 0.274 0.277 0.283 
OTC derivatives 0.332 0.332 0.281 0.294 0.338 0.341 0.337 
Banking claims 0.346 0.346 0.327 0.342 0.328 0.350 0.327 
International 
securities 
0.312 0.313 0.339 0.335 0.342 0.367 0.371 
FX reserves 0.552 0.493 0.480 0.458 0.441 0.472 0.433 
Global payments    0.309 0.293 0.298 0.310 
Average (4 functions) 0.372 0.356 0.354 0.351 0.346 0.366 0.353 
Average (6 functions)    0.335 0.336 0.351 0.344 
Source: own research and calculations 
However, between 2010 and 2019, the concentration of all the currency sub-roles either once again rose slightly 
or remained almost unchanged. Only where the foreign-exchange reserves role is concerned, the currency 
concentration continued to fall, dropping to a value of H = 0.43, the lowest level of currency concentration since 
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1995 (Cohen & Tabitha, 2013). The most significant fall in currency concentration can be seen in the foreign-
exchange reserves role. This is a result of a slight fall of the USD concentration and at the same time a rise in the 
concentration of lesser currencies. With respect to the bond market, the currency concentration indicator 
demonstrates an upward trend, particularly in the (post)crisis period starting in 2008, when the US dollar 
strengthened. 
When evaluating currency concentration using the average values of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, it is 
evident that the concentration at the level of the entire international monetary system has dropped slightly during 
the period in question. Nonetheless, there can be no claim of fundamental changes in concentration that would 
determine a new quality and multipolar nature of the international monetary system as a whole. It is worth noting 
that the currency concentration within the FX turnover and FX reserves indicators with regard to the individual 
currencies shows more than twice the ratio of the US dollar over the euro. However, it is evident (Tab. 5) that the 
currency concentration, measured with the help of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, is different. In relation to the 
foreign-exchange reserve role, the concentration is significantly higher than the turnover on the FX market. 
Table 6. Currency anchor level. 
(bil. USD, 2019) 
nominal value 




% share on global 
GDP 
US Dollar 137 383 1,791 2,311 2.65 
Euro 26 92 761 879 1.01 
Source: own research and calculations 
The last category analysed is the role of currency as an anchor. As mentioned, finding adequate data is a highly 
complicated process. The following statistics present one possibility of expressing the role of anchor currency in 
numbers, if only approximately. It is a rough estimate of the level of currency anchoring, at least due to two facts. 
In the category of soft peg exchange rate arrangements, other currencies are differently oriented to one of the 
world's reserve currencies. This intensely different level of monetary anchoring cannot be expressed statistically. 
The second reason is the very expression of monetary anchoring through gross domestic product. For individual 
national currencies, the gross national product would be a more accurate indicator; however, its value is not 
reported in officially available statistics. Table 6 illustrates the total share of GDP of those countries that have any 
of the three exchange rate structures mentioned above in the total world GDP (converted to US dollar at current 
exchange rates). Another 2.65 % of world GDP (outside the US) is “firmly anchored” to the US dollar, and 1.01 % 
(outside the Eurozone) in 2019 to the euro. Compared to the euro, the ratio of the US dollar in the role as anchor 
currency is more than double. Other reserve currencies occupy completely negligible values. It basically 
corresponds to the ratio of the US dollar and the euro in Table 4.      
Thus, it may be stated that the current international monetary system shows a gradual transition to a multipolar 
structure, yet it cannot be claimed that a multipolar monetary system exists. Currently it is a narrowing the role of 
some reserve currencies in the international monetary system, by in particular, the USD. The latest trend of 
lowering the role of the USD might create better conditions for growing the role of the Chinese renminbi in the 
international monetary system. On the basis of the results, we therefore do not reject our scientific hypothesis: 
Currency concentration in the international monetary system shows a downward trend between 2001 and 2019, 
but the international monetary system does not show a multipolar character.  
Conclusion 
The aim of this article was to address the issue of a possible change in polarity of the international monetary 
system through the concept of currency concentration in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. 
Currently the present an international monetary system based on the dominance role of the USD will pay the 
way for creation of the multipolar international monetary system constitutes a monetary system with three 
reserve currencies, i.e., USD, EUR and RMB. A multipolar international monetary system constitutes a monetary 
system with several world and reserve currencies. The change of polarity of the international monetary system 
was analysed with concentration ratios and the Herfindahl-Hirshmann index. The roles of the world reserve 
currencies represent the initial categories for the analysis of concentration in the international monetary system. 
The statistics presented herein are based on databases of supranational organizations, namely the International 
Monetary Fund, Bank for International Settlements and SWIFT.    
Between 2001 and 2019, the level of currency concentration of the key reserve currencies dropped slightly, 
although not enough to cause a qualitative change of the international monetary system. This means that the US 
dollar remains the dominant world reserve currency. Consequently, the international monetary system shows a 
“near-unipolar” structure, characterised by a single dominant currency (US dollar) and one currency with a 
significant ratio (euro). On the basis of our results, we have not rejected the scientific hypothesis on the falling 
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level of currency concentration and the non-existence of a multipolar monetary system. The findings show that it 
is too early to talk about a rapidly advancing process of multipolarization. The currency concentration of the euro 
and the Chinese renminbi remains significantly lower than the US dollar. The transition towards a multipolar 
monetary structure is a process that would not take just one or two years but rather several decades.  
The conclusions stated herein must be understood in the context of highly unfavourable economic changes 
during the first half of 2020. The current negative impact of the global pandemic on the deepening global 
economic recession may also lead to a reassessment of the current international monetary system. Despite the 
fact that the current world reserve currency is the US dollar, it is also possible to observe an increasing effect of 
the Chinese economy on the growth of the world economy, foreign exchange reserves, government bond 
issues, international payments, and others. This may have an impact on the operation of the current international 
monetary system, with a view to creating a multipolar monetary system. Currently the current dominant reserve 
currency is the US dollar. Due to the growing the role of the Chinese economy in the world economy will also 
increase the share of the renminbi not only a high level of foreign exchange reserves, but some countries and 
potentially companies will use a renminbi for the issuing bond, international payments and clearing, etc. This 
trend may have an impact on the operation of the current international monetary system, with a view to creating 
a new multipolar monetary system based on the USD, EUR and RMB.  
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